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Spain's Forgotten Role in the American 
Revolution 
The participation of other countries is 
generally absent from most American 
recollections of the Revolutionary War. The 
stories of the War of Independence 
generally invoke images of the young 
colonies rebelling against the British 
monarchy, but how could a small strip of 
colonies break away from Britain unaided? 
Acknowledgement is given to the 
French, if only briefly, for their presence at 
the Battle of Yorktown, but Americans tends 
to forget that France was the first ally of the 
United States. Even less attention is given to 
another European county that aided the war 
effort. Although rarely mentioned in 
textbooks, Spain played an important role in 
America's War of Independence. 
As a major colonial power in the 
Americas, Spain did not enter the war 
because its King believed that the British 
colonies had an inherent right to 
independence. However if the United States 
gained its independence, British colonial 
boundaries would be pushed further away 
from Latin America. The war also provided 
a renewed opportunity to reclaim lands lost 
to Great Britain, including Florida, Minorca 
and most importantly, the Rock of Gibraltar. 
American independence frequently seemed 
to hinge on possession of Gibraltar. Perhaps 
if Britain had not held on to it so tightly, the 
war could have ended differently. 
While initially participating in secret, 
Spain contributed weapons, supplies and 
money to fund the war. Then after formally 
declaring war on Great Britain, the Spanish 
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military strategy divided and therefore 
weakened Britain's forces through 
simultaneous battles in the Americas and 
Europe. Spain joined the war because 
American independence coincided with 
Spanish interests, yet its economic and 
military contributions influenced the course 
of the American Revolution. 
Relations between Britain, France and 
Spain as they existed on the eve of the 
revolution evolved over hundreds of years. 
There were numerous wars preceding the 
revolution, and the eighteenth century found 
a strengthening alliance between France and 
Spain. The century began with the War of 
Spanish Succession. By the close of the war 
in 1713, branches of the Bourbon Family 
held the French and Spanish thrones. They 
shared a common enemy in Great Britain, 
who became more powerful during the war. 
The British increased their territory by 
seizing Minorca and Gibraltar from Spain. 
They also secured limited trading rights in 
Latin America, which became a cover for 
black market and contraband trade in the 
Spanish colonies.' 
Relations with Britain soured further 
during the Seven Years War, which ended just 
thirteen years before the United States 
declared its independence. France and Spain 
experienced great losses in the war while 
Great Britain made strong gains. Spain 
joined France in the war as part of the Third 
Family Compact of 1761, an agreement 
between the Bourbon houses of France and 
Spain. They agreed to combine forces against 
Great Britain to defend their possessions, and 
neither side would negotiate peace without 
the consent of the other. 2 
The brief involvement in the Seven 
Years War went badly for Spain. Eight 
months after its official declaration of war, 
the British navy seized Cuba. British vessels 
also attacked and raided Spanish ships in 
the Caribbean. An estimated eleven million 
dollars was lost due to the raids. 3 France 
faired even worse. By the end of the war, it 
lost most of its colonial possessions in the 
Americas. Canada fell to the control of 
Great Britain, and France gave Louisiana, 
which included all of its territories west of 
the Mississippi River, to Spain. Meanwhile 
Britain expanded its North American 
territories even further by extending their 
western boundary to the east coast of the 
Mississippi River, and the British secured 
the right to navigate the river: Britain also 
took control of Florida after Spain offered it 
in order to recover Cuba.5 
The Treaty of Paris, which ended the 
war, addressed another point of growing 
conflict between Britain and Spain 
involving Central America. The British 
established lumber operations in the area, 
and there were increasing numbers of 
skirmishes between the English and 
Spanish. The British black market was also 
active in the region. With the treaty, Spain 
was forced to agree to no longer interfere 
with the English settlements.6 
Despite these gains by Britain, the 
Seven Years War ultimately resulted in the 
revolt of its American colonies. Sparked by 
an increase in taxes to pay for Britain's war 
expenses, the American Revolution provided 
a weakness that Spain and France could 
exploit. For Spain, the opportunity to push 
Britain away from Latin America was too 
great to ignore. Louisiana provided a buffer 
between the Spanish and British colonies, 
but if the Americans gained their 
independence and Spain reclaimed Florida, 
the southern boarder of the British 
territories would be pushed to Canada. 
Even before the United States declared 
its independence, secret negotiations began 
between the colonies, France and Spain. 
During these negotiations Jose Monillo y 
Redondo, the conde de Floridablanca, 
outlined what Spain expected for entering the 
war. Spain wanted to recover Gibraltar, 
Minorca and Florida, all of which were lost 
to Great Britain in previous wars. Spain also 
planned to seize British-held Jamaica and the 
Bahamas and to eliminate all British 
settlements on the east coast of Mexico, 
Honduras and Campeche, which were centers 
of illegal trade and smuggling operations.' 
Despite these ambitions for the course 
of the war, Spanish officials wanted to 
participate secretly in the early years of the 
conflict. Spain had to protect its own 
interests, namely its Latin American 
colonies. To openly aid the revolution of 
British colonies could inspire subsequent 
rebellions in Latin America. Officials were 
also concerned about risking the loss of 
Cuba or other territories in another war with 
Britain.' To safeguard Spanish interests by 
appearing to be neutral while still furthering 
the revolution, Spaniards set up a network 
of agents among the British in the Americas 
and, most importantly, a method of 
funneling greatly needed supplies and 
money into the colonies. 
By the end of the war, the amounts of 
Spanish currency going into the United 
States through New Orleans were so 
extensive that Spanish money was 
commonly seen throughout the colonies.9 
However Spain's initial contribution was 
made in collaboration with France. In 
November of 1775, the Continental 
Congress established the Committee of 
Secret Correspondence to solicit foreign aid, 
particularly from France and Spain.lo In 
response, the foreign ministers of the two 
countries set up the dummy company 
Roderique Hortalez et Cie in May 1776 
with one million livres in weapons and 
supplies donated from each country. 
Through this company, which was located 
in Paris but operated out of the Dutch 
Antilles, the two countries laundered money 
and supplies to the American cause. I I It 
remained in operation until France and 
Spain officially entered the war. 
By the end of 1776, Spain was using 
New Orleans to directly supply the 
American government. The Spanish city was 
initially used for this purpose after General 
George Gibson led a band of men from Fort 
Pitt to New Orleans, taking a route down the 
Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. Gibson 
operated under the direction of the 
Committee of Secret Correspondence. They 
collected nine thousand pounds of 
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gunpowder at a Spanish establishment up the 
river from' New Orleans. To avoid any 
suspicion by the British who had settlements 
along the Mississippi River, Louisiana's 
governor, Don Luis de Unzaga, placed 
Gibson under arrest. He was soon released 
and put on a vessel with more supplies. 12 
Later that year, a Royal Order released 
on December 24, 1776, declared that all 
involved Spanish officials, specifically the 
governors of Havana and Louisiana, were to 
give gunpowder and weapons to the 
Americans via free merchant ships.I3 In 
response, Jose de Galvez, the Minister of 
the Indies, implemented a plan for monthly 
shipments of weapons, gunpowder, 
ammunition and clothing. The shipments, 
which began in May 1777, routed the 
supplies from Spain to Cuba and then to 
New Orleans. I4 
When the first shipment arrived, local 
customs officials did not know about the 
royal order governing the supplies due to its 
level of secrecy. Because the bills of lading 
showed the Spanish government as the 
owner of the shipment, they took control of 
it and sent it to the garrison. In order to 
transfer the supplies to the Americans, 
Bernardo de Galvez, the newly appointed 
governor of Louisiana and nephew of Jose 
de Galvez, announced that the garrison's 
surplus of supplies would be sold at public 
auction. The governor then gave money to a 
local merchant to buy the shipment. To 
avoid future problems, subsequent 
shipments were transported to New Orleans 
on the merchant's ships and then stored in 
his warehouse. 15 
To transfer the shipments to the 
American government, the Continental 
Congress used Oliver Pollack, a resident of 
New Orleans. Pollack shipped the supplies 
up the Mississippi River to inland ports. In a 
letter to Galvez, the Continental Congress 
asked the governor to extend protection to 
Pollack and his shipment and to provide 
Pollack with money to cover the costs of the 
transports. I6 These shipments continued over 
the course of the war, although the route 
changed to the east coast following an 
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increase in British military activity on the 
Mississippi River. 17 
In addition to the regular shipments, the 
American government collected additional 
money and materials from New Orleans 
when needed. For instance, in the Spring of 
1778 approximately thirty American troops 
traveled down the Ohio and Mississippi 
Rivers to New Orleans, raiding British 
settlements imd plantations along the way. 
The expedition was organized by the 
Continental Congress as a way to retrieve 
more supplies from New Orleans. To 
reinforce Spanish claims of neutrality, 
Galvez notified his commanders on the river 
that English settlers fleeing the American 
troops could use Spanish establishments as 
places of refuge. He also secretly informed 
another commander to accept any 
conquered territories that the Americans 
may wish to tum over to Spain. When the 
expedition reached New Orleans, the 
captured British property and slaves were 
sold at public auction. The profits from the 
sale were in tum given to the Americans. 
Additional supplies were "sold" to Pollack, 
who transg0rted them upriver in the usual 
manner. 1 When the British learned that 
Galvez allowed the American raiders to 
remain in New Orleans, three British war 
ships separately sailed to New Orleans, each 
demanding the return of the captured 
property. Galvez defused the situation by 
returning some of the remaining property.I9 
As the American raiding party made its 
way to New Orleans, Spanish spies hiding 
out in British west Florida reported to 
Galvez that British troops mobilized in 
response to the American threat. 20 During 
the period of neutrality, Bernardo de Galvez 
sent agents into Florida to monitor British 
activity and to report on their defenses. In 
July 1777 one of the agents in Pensacola 
uncovered that there were two British agents 
in New Orleans, and that the British 
government was aware of the supplies given 
to the Americans. The British agents were 
captured in New Orleans and banished from 
Louisiana. 21 
As the covert operations continued in 
North America, open conflict erupted in 
South America. Spain quickly used Britain's 
distraction with the American Revolution to 
its advantage. In late 1776, Spain overtook a 
British smuggling operation in Brazil. Then 
in 1777 Spanish forces attacked illegal 
Portuguese and British trading posts in 
Uruguay and Argentina. 22 Spanish officials 
called the incidents in 1777 attacks on the 
Portuguese, and warned Britain that any 
interference could lead to a declaration of 
war. They were risking that British forces 
would not be spared from the colonies to 
react. The tactic worked, and the Spaniards 
shut down the smuggling operations.23 Spain 
and Portugal negotiated a peace treaty in 
October 1777. With the treaty, Great Britain 
lost its ally.24 
While Spain established its position 
against Great Britain in the Americas, 
representatives from France and Spain 
continued to negotiate the terms of an open 
entrance into the war. Floridablanca was 
hesitant to officially enter the conflict. As he 
expressed in December 1777, "Great 
wisdom is necessary in order not to delude 
ourselves nor to place ourselves on the 
precipice of a premature war in which any 
fatal blow could backfire on Spain, the 
country which has the most to lose under 
the present circumstances."25 Floridablanca 
pursued what was most beneficial for Spain. 
Therefore he pressed for specific 
stipulations. From the beginning, Gibraltar 
was always a requirement. He maintained 
that if Spain entered the war, peace could 
not be declared until it possessed Gibraltar.26 
As the negotiations carried on 
throughout 1777 and into 1778, the future 
boundaries of the United States became a 
principal question. Would its boundaries be 
limited to the boarders of the colonies, or 
would the United States adopt the 
boundaries of the surrounding British 
territory, which extended to the Mississippi 
River?27 If the United States expanded to the 
Mississippi River, its government would 
expect navigation rights. Navigation rights 
would take away Spain's monopoly on the 
trade at the mouth of river, plus the 
Mississippi could become a method for the 
new country to push into Louisiana, the only 
division between the Americans and Mexico. 
Floridablanca maintained that Spain must 
retain sole access to the mouth of the river 
and consequently the Gulf of Mexico. 
~rance's representative in the 
negotiations, Charles Gravier Comte de 
Vergennes, repeatedly tried to convince 
Floridablanca to compromise and enter the 
war with France.2s However as the 
discussions with Spain dragged on, 
Vergennes negotiated an independent alliance 
between France and the colonies. France and 
the United States entered into two treaties in 
February 1778, the Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce and the Treaty of Alliance. With 
these treaties, France officially recognized 
the independence of the United States. The 
French agreed that peace would not be 
negotiated with Great Britain until the 
monarchy recognized its independence, and 
neither ally would declare peace without the 
consent of the other. 29 
The French and Americans also signed 
a secret agreement regarding Spain. It 
stipulated that if Spain entered the war, its 
goals would be included in the peace 
negotiations, and they would not negotiate 
with Britain without Spain's consent. The 
Americans also agreed that if the United 
States took possession of Florida during the 
war, they would return it to Spain if 
Americans could have free navigation of the 
Mississippi River.30 
In February of 1779, Congress offered 
another compromise in which Spain would 
have sole navigation rights of the 
Mississippi River below thirty-first 
parallel. 31 Once again, Floridablanca 
refused. He also refused to compromise 
with France over Gibraltar. He was in a 
position to make demands, because France 
and the United States wanted Spain to 
enter the war. George Washington stated in 
October of 1778, "If the Spanish would but 
join their fleets to France and commence 
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hostilities, my doubts would all subside. 
Without if I fear the British navy has it too 
much in its power to counteract the 
schemes of France.m2 Finally in order to 
bring Spain into the war, Vergennes agreed 
to the demands over Gibraltar. 33 
On April 12, 1779 France and Spain 
entered into an alliance that officially 
brought Spain into the war. The Treaty of 
Aranjuez was not a treaty with the United 
States, and it did not make Spain a direct 
ally of the American colonies. However this 
alliance with France tied Spain to the 
pursuit of American independence, because 
it stipulated that peace could not be 
negotiated with Britain until the monarchy 
recognized the independence of the Untied 
States. It also stipulated that neither France 
nor Spain would negotiate peace without the 
consent of the other. In tum the French 
would not discuss peace without the consent 
of the United States due to their alliance. 
This treaty also established that the war 
would continue until Spain held Gibraltar, 
Minorca and Florida.34 Before entering into 
the alliance, Floridablanca gave a final 
opportunity to King George III. He offered 
Spanish neutrality if Britain would return 
Gibraltar.35 George III refused, and Spain 
accepted the treaty. The Spanish 
government announced its declaration of 
war against Britain on June 21, 1779.36 
Before the declaration was made, 
Bernardo de Galvez, the governor of 
Louisiana and Matias de Galvez, el 
Presidente de la Audiencia de Guatemala, 
were instructed to prepare for open military 
conflict with the British.37 Both men 
reported to Jose de Galvez in Cuba. The 
primary military plan for the war was to 
divide and therefore weaken British forces 
through simultaneous battles in Europe and 
the Americas. 
They began in the Gulf of Mexico. As 
Jose de Galvez related, "Divisions should be 
detached to clean out the English from the 
banks of the Mississippi, which should be 
considered like an outer wall of New 
Spain's vast empire."" Bernardo de Galvez 
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led an overland march to Manchac in 
September 1779, and the Spanish forces 
overtook the British fortification. He 
continued to Baton Rouge, which 
surrendered on September 22, and then to 
Fort Panmure in Natchez, which also 
surrendered. In one month England lost all 
of its ports on the Mississippi River, and 
Spain cut off all aid to British 
establishments on the river.39 
In the early months of 1780, Bernardo 
de Galvez led a sea assault against Mobile. 
He then moved on to British-Florida. Since 
its early settlement, Florida held little value 
for Spain as it lacked any valuable natural 
resources and held a relatively small native 
popUlation. However British Florida was a 
threat to Spanish activities in the Gulf of 
Mexico and to Louisiana. Through his 
agents, Galvez had detailed information on 
the military infrastructure of Pensacola, the 
seat of the civil and military government in 
East Florida and Britain's key position in 
the Gulf of Mexico:o His forces laid siege 
to the settlement, and the British 
surrendered Pensacola, thereby giving up 
their last foothold in the Gulf. 
As Bernardo de Galvez moved 
offensively against the British in North 
America, his father, Jose de Galvez, 
commanded the Spanish armies in Central 
America. After Spain's declaration of war, 
word circulated of an impending British 
invasion. British forces moved up the San 
Juan River in Central America. They were 
pushed back by Matias de Galvez's men, 
who in tum attacked British-held Roatan, 
Honduras.4 ! For the remainder of the war, he 
coordinated forces with the governor of the 
Yucatan to destroy all English settlements in 
the area.42 
While these battles developed in the 
Americas, combined French and Spanish 
forces simultaneously led assaults in 
Europe, specifically on Minorca and 
Gibraltar. The brunt of these Franco-Spanish 
forces was set on Gibraltar, which was 
under constant assault throughout the war:3 
Near the close of the war, the allies even 
contemplated an invasion of England itself.44 
. As the Spanish military continued its 
assault in Europe and the Americas, 
Floridablanca secretly organized 
negotiations with Great Britain in 1780. He 
offered to withdraw from the war if Britain 
would hand over Gibraltar. These secret 
negotiations violated Spain's treaty with 
France, but Floridablanca proposed a way to 
accommodate the Franco-Spanish and 
Franco-American treaties without Britain 
officially recognizing the independence of 
the colonies. His plan was for Britain to 
offer a truce in which the war would end, 
and Britain and the colonies would retain 
whatever areas they held at the time the 
truce was called. These negotiations 
continued until early 1781, but King George 
refused each of his offers.45 
George III was confident that Britain 
would triumph in the war. However English 
perspectives changed after the British 
General Charles Lord Cornwallis 
surrendered his 8000-man force at Yorktown, 
Virginia on October 18 1781, after a nine-
day battle with French and American 
forces. 46 Spain was indirectly involved in the 
battle. Jose de GaJvez released the French 
fleet that blocked Chesapeake Bay from 
their position in the West Indies. They were 
replaced by the Spanish navy, which agreed 
to protect French possessions in the 
Caribbean. In addition, the battle was 
financed by money from the Spanish 
government.4' Perhaps most importantly, 
however, Spain divided British naval forces 
through the battles in Europe and Central 
America. In defense of Gibraltar, Britain did 
not send naval reinforcements to the 
American colonies:s Reinforcements may 
have overcome the French blockade and 
changed the course of the war. 
After the defeat at Yorktown, British 
public opinion turned against the war and 
on February 27, 1782, the House of 
Commons voted to end all offensive 
military action against the Americas:9 
However, Floridablanca was not willing to 
seriously negotiate peace without Gibraltar. 
As the European powers debated terms of 
settlement, the United States held separate 
negotiations with Great Britain. Britain 
agreed to recognize the independence of the 
United States and to relinquish its territories 
to the Mississippi River in return for 
navigation rights. Throughout the war, 
Floridablanca was determined to secure the 
Mississippi for Spain, but had no control 
over the issue once it was settled between 
the United States and Britain. 
Meanwhile the fighting continued 
between the European powers. By this time, 
Bernardo de Galvez headed the West Indies 
operations, and he planned an attack on 
British-held Jamaica. However the plan was 
abandoned after much of his forces were 
sent to control a rebellion that erupted in 
South American.50 Meanwhile Franco-
Spanish forces captured Minorca and kept 
Gibraltar under constant attack. Then on 
September II, 1782, a British fleet of thirty-
four naval vessels and over one hundred 
merchant ships defeated the allied forces. 51 
Unable to take it by force, the Spanish could 
no longer debate over Gibraltar. 
With little hope of recovering Gibraltar, 
Spain relented to negotiations with Britain. 
The parties agreed to an armistice and 
preliminary accord, which included the 
agreements between the United States and 
Britain. Representatives of Britain, France 
and Spain signed the Treaty of Paris at 
Versailles on January 20, 1783.52 For its 
efforts in the Revolution, Spain recovered 
possession of Florida and Minorca through 
the treaty, but it could not regain the coveted 
Rock of Gibraltar. 
The colonies declared their 
independence at a time when Spain and 
France welcomed an opportunity to defeat 
the British. Spaniards participated in the war 
out of their own interests in weakening 
Britain, regaining territories lost in 
preceding wars and pushing the British 
away from Latin America. Pursuit of these 
interests coincided with the needs of the 
Revolution. However the question remains, 
what would have happened if Spain's 
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interests were no longer aligned with those 
of the United States? 
Floridablanca appeared always eager to 
trade American independence for Gibraltar, 
but George III would not agree. Perhaps the 
war would have had a different outcome if 
King George had not held on to it so tightly. 
If Floridablanca had his way, Spain may 
have withdrawn from the war, taking with it 
the supplies, money and military power it 
added to the American cause. Great Britain 
undoubtedly could have concentrated its 
forces in the colonies if there was not a 
need to combat the assault on Gibraltar. The 
turning point of the war was the Battle of 
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Yorktown, but if the British fleet protecting 
Gibraltar was in the colonies instead, 
perhaps it could have overcome the French 
blockade and won the battle. 
Regardless of these possibilities, the 
Revolution remained aligned with Spain's 
interests, and Spain contributed to the 
American cause throughout the Revolution. 
Spanish financial aid sustained the war, 
while its military power drew British forces 
way from the colonies to Europe and Latin 
America. Therefore although never an ally 
of the United States, Spain was directly tied 
to the American pursuit of independence. 
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